as such. The sudden jump in per capita agricultural output following introduction of the household responsibility system in China, despite the country's one billion-plus inhabitants, is only a recent proof of this proposition.
Those who find the argument of this paper extreme should be reminded that its implications are by no means novel or idiosyncratic: note, for example, the value attached in traditional religious teachings to maximizing the number of redeemed souls.
Optimal population and population control
The classical theory of optimal population (Cannan, 1888; Carr-Saunders, 1931 ) is based on the maximization of per capita production, consumption, or utility (the three being maximized at the same level of population in the simple static model with no preference for population density or family size). As illustrated in Figure 1 , optimal population according to this classical criterion is at PaJ*. If the existing population is higher than Pa,*, surely population control is justified? A number of considerations should be taken into account before answering this question.
First, people derive utility not just from income but also from having children. If a family is willing to reduce its per capita income by increasing its size, why should it not be allowed to do so without government intervention, unless such questions as ignorance (especially regarding birth control) and/or externalities (to be discussed below) are involved? It may be true that the free choice of family size involves a steady decline in (or failure to increase) per capita incorne, but, in the absence of ignorance and externalities, if families decide to have this time profile of family size and per capita income, why should they not be allowed to so choose'? Unless there is parental negligence, Second, even abstracting from preference for children, the objective of maximizing per capita (or average) utility is subject to debate. Meade (1955) proposed the alternative criterion of maximizing total utility, that is, average utility times population (this criterion has been traced to Landry, 1934) . With this alternative criterion, the level of optimal population P,* is obviously higher than Pa* and depends not only on the average product curve but also on the utility function (of average product). It is quite possible that P,* is much higher than Pa*. The fact that the existing population is much larger than Pa* need not then justify population control unless average, instead of total utility is accepted as the maximand.
Economists (in fact, philosophers as well) are divided, however, between the two criteria. For example, Dasgupta (1969) and Friedman (1981) are persuaded by the Meade criterion of maximizing total utility. Nevertheless, most, if not all economists seem to hold that, while we cannot kill off a segment of the existing population in order to maximize the average utility of the rest, there is no point in increasing population size beyond the point of maximum average utility, since unborn people have no moral claims and have no "right" to exist (Harsanyi, in Ng, 1983, p. 167). The view that unborn people have no rights can be effectively countered by the following argument.
Can unborn people be ignored?
Because we are discussing the acceptability of a criterion at a general level, arguments based on hypothetical examples (even if irrelevant in practical terms) are methodologically acceptable.
Suppose that the question of old-age support has already been solved by automation or other means, so that a society of exclusively old people is feasible. Suppose also that every family marginally prefers having no children to having children and either does not care about the continuation of mankind or does not care enough to balance its preference for no children. Then the utility of the present generation is maximized by letting mankind become extinct within one generation. Since the disappearance (or nonappearance) of mankind applies only to the future and to unborn generations, those who believe that unborn people have no rights must sanction the alternative of letting mankind become extinct, even if the alternative of perpetual regeneration were achievable at only a small cost to the present generation, and even if future generations will enjoy high levels of welfare.
It seems clear to me that, to avoid the extinction alternative, we must take the welfare of prospective individuals into account. Prospective individuals are those who may be born in the future under one alternative but may not be born under another. That these people are yet unborn does not destroy their claim to be taken into account in a policy choice that may decide their existence or otherwise. Most people regard B as better or at least as no worse than A. Alternative C (and a fortiori D), being strictly better than B, must be better than A. Although one thousand individuals suffer a huge loss in utility (in moving from A to C), the gain to the rest of the society more than offsets it.
There seem to be few, if any, valid grounds for not extending the above judgment that C and D are superior to A to the issue of optimal population. Since the utility of an unborn (or prospective) person must be regarded as equal to zero (as he can feel neither pain nor pleasure), and since the welfare of prospective persons cannot be ignored (otherwise we cannot solve the extinction paradox discussed above), the comparable alternatives in population choice to A, B, C, and D are as follows:
A' A society of one thousand individuals, each enjoying a utility level of one million units. B' A society of one million individuals, each enjoying a utility level of one thousand units. C' A society of one million individuals, each enjoying a utility level of 1,001 units. D' A society of one million individuals, each enjoying a utility level of 900,000 units.
Just as most people prefer C or D over A, so they should also prefer C' or D' over A', despite the fact that A' has the highest average utility (utility per head). The unacceptability of maximizing average utility in the choice of population size is that the average is calculated over only the existing population in a given alternative, thus ignoring the utility of prospective individuals. For example, in comparing the average utility of A' and D', the 999 ,000 individuals who would exist and enjoy a high level of utility in D' are completely ignored in the calculation of the average utility of A'. If we are comparing alternative policies affecting only the same set of individuals (e.g., the one thousand in A'), it is quite logical to ignore other unaffected and unborn individuals. Similarly, in the choice between A' and D', the prospective second million individuals who would exist in another alternative E but who do not exist in either A' or D' may logically be ignored. But in the choice between A' and D', the prospective individuals who would exist in society D' but not in A' should not be ignored. The maximization of average utility seems quite reasonable, provided the average is over all relevant individuals, including prospective individuals. For example, the average utility of A', in a choice between A' and D', should be taken as (1,000,000 x 1,000 + 0 x 999,000)/ 1,000,000 = 1,000, which is much smaller than the average utility of 900,000 in D'. Of course, the maximization of this comparable average utility coincides with the maximization of total utility (sum of utility over all relevant individuals).
The ethical unacceptability of maximizing (noncomparable) average utility can be seen by the following comparison. Consider the alternatives: Comparing Y to X, the same ten individuals enjoy exactly the same utility levels in both situations, while five more individuals have the benefits of enjoying a reasonably happy life in Y but not in X. They prefer to be born rather than not. The ten individuals have no objection whatsoever to the appearance of the five additional persons. I can only conclude that Y is better than X. Comparing Z to Y, we find that Z is better than Y according to either maximization of the average or total utility (or in fact according to some other consideration, such as equality). So Z must be better than X from transitivity of strict preference. But Z has a smaller (noncomparable) average utility.
Some people may object that Y need not be better than X since Y involves some inequality. In reply to this, first note that we need not have inequality in income distribution in Y; the five additional persons could just be slightly less joyful individuals. And since X, Y, Z are presented for ultimate choice, no question of the effect on the future arises. If it does, it should have been specified in the relevant alternative. It is thus compelling for Y to be regarded as better than X. Nevertheless, for those who may have an inherent preference for equality as such, over and above its contribution to welfare, consider the following alternatives: M Four individuals, each with 100 utils plus another four individuals, each with 25 utils. N The same eight individuals as above (i.e., four with 100 utils each and another four with 25 utils each), plus another ten individuals, each with 58 utils.
In comparison to M, N has ten additional quite happy individuals (each with 58 utils) and also has a more equal overall distribution of utility. It is difficult, especially for people with egalitarian ethics (for whom this comparison is designed), not to prefer N over M. But N has a lower average utility (60 utils) than M (62.5 utils). I hope that most readers have been persuaded that maximizing (noncomparable) average utility is not an acceptable criterion for optimal population. The fact that a given population size is higher than the level that maximizes average utility thus is not an acceptable ground for population control.
External costs of a larger population
Unless there exist significant external costs or benefits, population control is difficult to justify since the optimizing behavior of individuals (in determining family size in particular) should then bring about the optimal size of population. This follows from the basic theorems of welfare economics, which show that a Pareto optimal situation is achieved by individual optimization coordinated by the market mechanism, satisfying certain conditions (mainly the absence of externalities, monopolistic power, and ignorance).5 On the issue of population, all individuals (or families, rather) are atomistic and no question of monopolistic power exists.6 However, many couples (especially the less educated in the less developed countries) may be ignorant of the opportunity for birth control. Thus, the provision of information, education, and access to birth control methods may well be justified. But stronger measures of population control cannot be justified on the ground of ignorance. This leaves us with externality as a possible ground.
Pareto optimality of laissez-faire
In the absence of ignorance and external costs (including the external costs of parents' choices on the welfare of their children), whenever a family decides to have another child, this additional member is expected to increase the happiness of the family and also to enjoy a happy life (or at worst not an unhappy one, otherwise an external cost is present), Of course, in the real world of uncertainty, not all decisions turn out as expected. But unless a systematic bias is present (due to ignorance), a decision to have a new member should on average turn out to be welfare-improving both for the existing family and for the new member. If the new member is bestowed with an inheritance, this is the preference of his parents. The inheritance received by his brothers and sisters may thereby be reduced. In fact, some existing family member may be made worse off not only financially but also in other ways. However, if the family (or the parents) decides to have the new member anyway, the society must accept this decision (unless it imposes its will on other members of the society or there is criminal parental negligence). The intrafamily conflict presumably has to be settled by The Welfare Economics of Population Control the family itself. Before making a decision, good parents will weigh the utility loss (if any) imposed on existing members against the utility gain. If there is no major distortion in the factor market, the new member (when grown up) will receive the value of his marginal product (VMP), in addition to any inheritance, as discussed above. If he is going to lead a happy life with his VMP and his inheritance, and if he imposes no net external costs on the society, then his birth is obviously a Pareto improvement (ignoring any possible conflict within his family of birth) since no family is made worse off, his family of birth is made better off, and he is happy. This is true even if the marginal product is well below the average product, such as the point Pl in Figure 1 . Thus, despite the fact that the average product is falling and the existing population is well over the level (Pa*) that maximizes the average product, it may still be Pareto optimal to have more people. We have shown above that II is a Pareto improvement over I. The society decides that III is an overall social improvement over II (mainly on distributional grounds). So III must be better than I from transitivity, although III is not a Pareto improvement over I.
Nevertheless, after the introduction of subsidies, decisions to have more children will not necessarily be Pareto optimal. However, there are offsetting considerations. First, the subsidies have to be financed, presumably from increased taxation. In the long run, this increase in taxation will fall on the new generations themselves. Presumably, large families with low incomes will receive net subsidies, while small families with high incomes will pay higher taxes because of the subsidies. Thus, at least for those who expect their children to bear a higher tax burden, there is some offsetting effect on the distortion of the choice of family size created by subsidies.
Second, if the marginal births induced by the subsidies bring forth people who would have been happy even without the subsidies, then these additional births are still desirable on the ground of a Pareto improvement and comparisons between alternatives I, II, III above. Now, subsidies for education, family allowances, and so forth are more substantial in well-to-do economies. And in such economies, it is more likely that the additional births induced by the subsidies will bring forth people who would have been happy even without the subsidies. This is so because VMP of labor is high and because most parents in these economies decide to have a child only if they expect to be able to support him quite comfortably, perhaps not so much for the welfare of the child as for their own happiness. On the other hand, in less well-to-do economies, educational and family subsidies are less substantial, even in a relative sense. Hence, in either case, the argument of indirect externality created by subsidies is unlikely to provide a strong justification for population control, with some possible exceptions. Even in these exceptions, sanctions cannot be justified against those who are willing to have more children without the subsidies.
Congestion of common resources
Common resources such as beaches and free parklands that are collectively owned are usually available to all members of the community free of charge. If they are heavily congested, an increase in population imposes congestion costs on the present population. This externality is due to the failure to impose suitable congestion charges on these resources and facilities. Instead of justifying population control, this situation justifies efficient pricing of scarce resources. It may be argued that the transaction costs of pricing these resources outweigh the benefits of increased efficiency in their utilization. If this is true, the externality involved is unlikely to be significant enough to justify the more drastic measure of population control, which not only involves transaction costs of its own, but also limits the choice of individual families and denies the birth of potentially happy individuals. Furthermore, for those public goods like defense, education, and roads that are provided out of general or specific taxation, even though they may not be charged for specific usage, their use will not be free to newly born individuals as these individuals will have to pay their share of taxation. Unless their share of taxes falls below the congestion costs they impose, no external cost is involved. The external cost, if any, is unlikely to be large, since some of the more important public goods (e.g., defense, broadcasting, research) are not subject to congestion. An increase in population size allows the per capita cost of providing these public goods to be lowered. Even if an increase in population imposes net congestion, existing people may gain from the economies of scale in the provision of public goods.7 Unless congestion costs are huge, there is no justification for population control. And even if congestion costs really are huge, some form of pricing to achieve efficiency should be feasible in most cases. For example, it may not be feasible to tax road usage directly, but registration fees and taxes on fuels can be designed to take account of congestion and pollution.
In countries where the means of production (land and accumulated capital) mainly are not privately owned, there is greater scope for the existence of externalities. If the publicly owned means of production are more-or-less shared equally (or in a given pattern giving a positive share to new individuals), an increase in population decreases the share enjoyed by the existing population. The share enjoyed by the new members is mainly in the form of subsidized education and free public goods. The public ownership of the means of production allows some profits to be made by public enterprises that can be used to subsidize education, family allowances, and so forth before requiring taxation. So, the only qualification to the argument of the preceding two paragraphs is in terms of the possible quantitative significance of the excess of congestion costs over tax share. Due to the low level of efficiency in public enterprises (and hence low profitability), this quantitative qualification is likely to be small.
Unemployment
If there exists significant unemployment (due for example to minimum-wage legislation), an additional worker may generate very low marginal product from the social point of view but face significant expected wages (wages times the probability of employment). Each additional person may impose an external cost by reducing the probability of employment faced by others. This externality is created by the unemployment-causing factors such as minimum-wage legislation. Rather than justifying population control, this would seem to justify the dismantling of distortion-creating legislation (leaving equality to be sought by less distorting methods).
As long as we wish to make people's income higher than the VMP of their factor endowment, some distortion is likely to be involved both in the revenue and subsidy processes and in the decisions with respect to family size (as was noted in the discussion of the indirect cost of subsidies, above). The distortion involved, however, may be less than that introduced by minimumwage legislation, since unemployment may significantly reduce the social marginal product of labor.
In extreme presentations of the argument that additions to the population entail external costs, the number of jobs is assumed to be invariant with respect to the size of population or number of workers, and the unemployed are assumed to have zero marginal product. These two extreme assumptions exaggerate the externality imposed by additional people on existing people. If every family has one child, we have full employment. This does not mean that, if every family has two children, unemployment will be 50 percent, even if minimum wages are unchanged. The population size of many countries has grown several hundred percent over the past century, but rates of unemployment have fluc-tuated rather than exploded. A larger economy generates a higher demand for labor. In fact, rigorous studies (e.g., Withers and Pope, 1985) on the effects of immigration on employment show no effect-that is, the employmentgenerating effects balance the job-filling effects. If a couple decides to have another child even if that child is expected to lead an unhappy life, their decision may be said to involve an external cost (on the unhappy child). Even if the child will be mildly happy, if his presence reduces the happiness of other family members significantly, an external cost (on the brothers and sisters) may still be present. This externality, while possible, is unlikely to be significant. It may be true that many parents in less developed countries have children even if they will be unhappy and will reduce the total happiness of the families concerned. But this is due mainly to ignorance of birth control, not to a deliberate decision to have these children. It is conceivable that parents may be made happier by having another unhappy child, but this is not very likely. First, parents care about the welfare of their children: if their children are unhappy, they become unhappy. This is largely determined by our genes since uncaring parents are unlikely to produce healthy children who are brought up to have their own offspring. Second, unhappy children tend to make other members of the family (including the parents) unhappy even if the parents do not care about their welfare, for obvious reasons.
Third, most happiness surveys indicate that even people in very poor countries are, on the whole, happy. Poor people adjust to their poor living standard and manage to derive happiness out of life except in special circumstances, such as the Cultural Revolution in China, when the enormous strain imposed upon individuals and families by social turmoil is both abnormal and impossible to adjust to fully. This is not to say that economic growth does not contribute to welfare, only to say that very poor but well-adjusted people are 
Big versus small families
There is a possible type of external cost of large families that seems to be largely ignored in the literature on the economics of population. From my personal experience in the countryside of China (from talks with relatives and friends), I understand that one of the important reasons people in rural areas want to have many children, especially sons, is that more sons mean more fists; a big family with many big boys is less likely to be bullied. If the extra fists are used not just in safeguarding the security of the family, but also in threatening others, an external cost may be involved. Obviously, the correct way to redress this externality is to raise the level of law and order. Before this could be achieved, the external costs involved could be used only as an argument for limiting the size of families that are already big-say those with at least two sons. It could hardly be used to justify the policy of one child per family practiced currently in China. Moreover, it could be argued that any society that is unable to raise the level of law and order is unlikely to be able to enforce a control on family size. The resources used for population control could be better employed to raise the level of law and order.
Some invalid arguments for population control
In the previous section, we noted that popular ignorance may justify governmental provision of information relating to birth control, but that efforts to limit population size have to be justified on stronger grounds. Externality is one possible ground; but, after examining a number of possible sources of externality, we argued that they are not significant enough quantitatively or they merely justify the dismantling of some distortive measures or the introduction of efficient pricing rather than the control of population growth. In this section, we examine some popular arguments for population control and conclude that they are invalid unless combined with ignorance or externality.
Limited resources and reduction in per capita income
Population control is most frequently justified on the ground that increases in population will cause a severe strain on a nation's limited resources and lead to a reduction (at least in the rate of growth) in per capita income. As argued above, a reduction in per capita income does not imply a reduction in per capita utility. In the very short run, of course, the birth of a baby immediately reduces the per capita income of the family and of the nation. However, as forcefully asked by P. T. Bauer (1981, p. 47), "do the parents feel worse off? Would they feel better off if they could have no children or if some of them died?" Furthermore, the maximization of per capita utility is not necessarily an acceptable objective function, and the presumption that population growth reduces per capita income need not be true.
In 
Per capita income
Per capita income that lowers the per capita income below E decreases the growth rate of population by more than the growth rate of national income, leading to an increase back to E in the long run. Any shock that increases the per capita income above E (but below 7) increases the growth rate of population by more than the growth rate of national income, also leading back to E in the long run. An economy with a low per capita income may thus be trapped at the low-level equilibrium point E.
The theory of a low-level equilibrium population trap seems to provide strong support for population control. If, through such control, rates of population growth could be reduced to, say, the level of the broken curve in Figure  2 , per capita income would grow indefinitely. Moreover, after an initial reduction in its growth rate, population would also increase and eventually surpass the level attained without population control (i.e., staying in the trap), provided that the height of the broken curve, at higher per capita income, remains above point E. Thus, after an initial transitional period, we have the best of everything. Unless the social rate of time preference is very high, it seems irrational not to choose population control.
It may be true that controlled population growth is preferable to the trap. But a superior solution that avoids the trap is to raise the income growth curve through higher accumulation rather than through forced population control. If the choice to have one additional child does not significantly impinge on the welfare of others through external costs, people should not be forced, nor even encouraged to forgo having additional children. If it is desirable to help future generations, it is better to do so by transferring general resources through accumulation than through distortion of people's choice now. A policy of forced savings is better than population control (unless ignorance or external costs are involved) since the former involves transfer of general purchasing power (or resources) at only the costs of administration and those of the net (of income effects) disincentive of taxation, while population control (or any other specific distortion of individual preferences) involves distortive costs on top of the administrative and disincentive costs. (See Ng, 1984, for the details of this argument.) It may be thought that no disincentive is involved in a policy of population control that is applied to rich and poor alike. This is not really true since the same policy (e.g., one calling for no more than x children per family) will be regarded as resulting in a greater economic loss by the rich. So income-neutral controls are more akin to proportional taxes (which have some disincentive effects) than to lump-sum taxes. Nevertheless, the disincentive effects of income-neutral population controls may be less than those of the accumulation through progressive taxation. However, income-neutral population control is inferior to forced accumulation of savings through proportionate taxation. If accumulation through progressive taxation is preferable to accumulation through proportionate taxation because of equity considerations, it must also be better than income-neutral population control, taking both equity and efficiency into account. Using the same logic, one could tell the following story: "A small firm plans to increase its profit by increasing output. This plan is shared by almost every firm in the industry. The price of the product collapses, causing all firms to run into the red. If they had their way, all firms would wish to limit the output levels of others." Although we have the same isolation paradox here, this circumstance does not make the restriction of competitive output socially optimal unless external costs are involved. Despite the isolation paradox, competitive firms do not run into the red most of the time. Each firm has to estimate the likely response of the whole industry (e.g., in response to a fall in costs) before deciding on its expansion plans. Similarly, a father has to estimate the future cost of land in planning his family expansion. The reason for the problem illustrated in the World Bank example above is the ignorance of the villagers. If this is the crux of the problem, providing the villagers with the relevant information (e.g., at the present population growth rate, the land/labor ratio will be halved in x years, and land prices are likely to increase by y) will suffice to solve the problem.
The problem of "external effects of population growth" discussed by John Pitchford (1985) can be seen in a similar light: "A family can be expected to realize that their decision to have an additional child is not going to affect the income that child will later receive. Yet all families facing the same choices and constraints and making such decisions will produce a rise in the population above what it would otherwise have been, which will force down future output per head, income, and wages below what they otherwise would have been, that is below the level the rational planning family expected" (p. 265).
Nevertheless, as Pitchford himself recognizes, "it is the possible failure of the individual family to perceive the demographic trends in the economy and their consequences which may result in too many children in the decreasing In the absence of ignorance and externalities, isolation creates no problems and creates no paradoxes.
Some external benefits of more births
Since man is a social animal, each of us exerts both external costs and benefits on others. For example, my laughter is regarded by some people as amusing and by some as annoying. Similarly, children may adversely affect neighbors with their cries and pranks, but also provide amusement and company to relatives, friends, and neighbors. If such external costs and benefits are negligible or largely mutually offsetting (with costs roughly counterbalancing benefits), they may be ignored. We have argued that there do not exist external costs significant enough to justify population control, especially if the right policies for dealing with externalities, inequality, and so forth are followed. Let us now examine the major external benefits of a growing population.
In deciding whether to have another child, a family is likely to proceed only if the effect on the welfare of existing family members is positive. If it is expected that the new child will, on balance, enjoy positive welfare, an external benefit to the child himself may be said to be involved in the decision. In the absence of ignorance and other externalities, if the family itself is indifferent between having the additional child and not having him, then the birth will be socially beneficial. Assuming positive welfare, the child himself would prefer to be born, the family is indifferent, no one else is hurt. This must be accepted as a (perhaps extended) Pareto optimal improvement.8 Some people believe that the (positive) welfare of as yet unborn persons should not be taken into account. But most people believe that it is bad to create unhappy persons. The asymmetry is difficult to accept. Morever, the extinction paradox discussed above in the form of the question "Can unborn people be ignored?" shows that failing to take account of the positive welfare of prospective persons is unacceptable. Besides economies of scale in production and in defense, the positive welfare of prospective persons should be the major reason justifying the policy of encouraging population growth in certain countries with negative population growth rates.
What about the effects of more births on the rest of the community? These effects are likely to be positive if adequate measures are taken to address major external costs. First, more people reduce the per capita cost share of each in the provision of noncongested public goods (such as defense, research, and broadcasting), as already remarked above. The counter-argument that more people reduce per capita income is invalid if the additional people receive only their marginal products.
Second, having more people provides more companionship and a larger range of choice of friends, partners, and marriages. It also provides a larger range of choice of places of residence and lifestyles. That more people also create external costs (e.g., congestion, pollution) is not a valid counterargument if appropriate measures (e.g., congestion and pollution taxes on fuel consumption) have been taken to tackle these external costs.
A question arises as to the asymmetry of external costs and benefits. Why do I advocate taxes on external costs to internalize the externalities but not subsidies on external benefits? The reason is that most external benefits involved here are what I call nonamenable externalities. These usually involve noneconomic activities such as social interaction that change their character once taxes/subsidies are introduced. Thus, if my neighbor and/or I were paid a subsidy to be friendly to each other, I would no longer enjoy spontaneous friendship. Worse, we might avoid chatting with each other to avoid being suspected of seeking such a subsidy. (For a more detailed analysis of nonamenable externalities, see Ng, 1975.) Third, as long as certain minimum nutritional and educational standards are met, the existence of more people increases the probabilities of society's producing another Aristotle, Beethoven, Copernicus, Darwin, Einstein, Franklin, Goethe. It is true that if we pay our scientists, composers, poets, and writers their respective average marginal productivities, no externalities are involved. A Nobel Prize-winning scientist may contribute many times more than his income. This implies, however, that there are many other scientists who receive more than their marginal products. On average (which is what we can expect from having nonselective births), no externalities are involved. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that scientists, poets, and others are paid their marginal products on average, at least not from a global and historical perspective. Great contributions are usually beneficial to the whole of mankind for a long time. Politicians, pressed to economize on expenditures, are likely to take a national and short-term perspective. Many academics may still be earning far more than their marginal products, but the great contributions made from time to time more than offset this discrepancy. This may be an argument in favor of more research funding that will certainly increase the number of scientific discoveries. But I think that contributions at the very highest level are more a function of the number of geniuses, which, assuming nonselective breeding, is in turn a proportionate function of the size of population,9 once some minimum nutritional and educational standards are reached.
It is true that the existence of more people also means more criminals. The harm inflicted on an average person by criminals, however, is more a function of the number of criminals per million inhabitants, while the benefits 2 Those who worry about the distributional impact of the pricing alternative (so the rich can afford large families and the poor cannot) should consult my third best argument (Ng, 1984)-namely, that a dollar should be treated as a dollar to whomsoever it accrues, leaving the distributional objective to be achieved by income taxation. Such taxation, despite its disincentive effects, is better than the violation of efficiency that has efficiency costs in addition to its disincentive effects.
3 Likewise Julian Simon (1977, 1981) , convinced that population explosion is, with war, one of the two most important issues facing mankind, embarked on a systematic study of the economics of population growth and found that the presumed dangers of the socalled explosion are a myth.
4 As in all discussions of optimal population, we are using a comparable cardinal utility approach. Many modern economists are skeptical of this approach after the ordinalist revolution, which shows the adequacy of ordinal utility for the analysis of consumer choice. Occam's razor requires that we shave off the assumption of cardinalism in consumer theory. But this does not prevent one from using cardinal utility in social choice in general and in population issues in particular. (To believe otherwise is to commit the "fallacy of misplaced abstraction"; see Ng, 1979 Ng, /1983 6 From the theory of second best, one may think that the existence of monopolistic power or other imperfections in other sectors of the economy will impinge on the optimal choice of family size. However, this effect is likely to be very small as the choice of family is largely affected by considerations other than relative prices of goods. Moreover, unless most overpriced (relative to marginal costs) goods are highly complementary to children or are substitutes for them and the reverse is true for most underpriced goods, even the small effects will offset each other. Hence, from the theory of third best (Ng, 1977; 1979 , one may proceed with the analysis of the issue of population on the as-if assumption that the rest of the economy is distortion free, except when some specific major distortions impinging directly on family size are present.
7 It might be argued that additional people may also increase the per capita costs of some other public goods. This can be true, however, only through congestion or some other form of external costs. A doubling of all inputs must at least double output as at least production could go on at twice the previous process. But as a consequence of indivisibilities, a doubling of all inputs may more than double output. Thus one may have economies of scale, but one cannot have diseconomies of scale unless some inputs (e.g., land) are held fixed so as to cause congestion.
8 For the extension of Pareto optimality to a variable population, see Friedman (1981) .
9 Apart from the size of population, the growth in population may also stimulate innovation; e.g., see Boserup (1965 Boserup ( , 1981 and Clark (1967 
